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Interfamilial Issues
Stéphane Madelrieux
1 Chery Misak’s  book on the history of  American pragmatism1 is  both descriptive  and
normative. She tells the story of the continuous presence of the pragmatist inspiration in
America through five generations of  eminent philosophers from Chauncey Wright  to
Hilary  Putnam  born  100 years  after  him,  showing  that  pragmatism  has  never  been
eclipsed from the philosophical scene even during the heyday of logical empiricism. At
the  same time,  she  divides  American  pragmatists  between a  good trend going  from
Charles Sanders Peirce to Clarence Irving Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars and a bad trend going
from William James and John Dewey to Richard Rorty. The good guys take the whole aim
of an inquiry to be to get things objectively right, while the bad guys are irremediably
subjectivist and relativist, “tossing us in a sea of arbitrariness, where there is no truth or
where truth varies from person to person or culture from culture” (2013: 4). Needless to
say  that  the  author,  originally  a  Peirce  scholar,  wants  to  save  the  reputation  of
pragmatism by cutting off the rotten branch of the tree, a necessary separation that could
provide with the opportunity to further the association between pragmatism and analytic
philosophy.  The  advantage  of  a  normative  standpoint  when  analyzing  a  story  is  to
highlight some parts of it that have been hitherto neglected – this is the case with the real
philosophical  affinities  between pragmatists  and logical  empiricists  beyond the  mere
strategy of alliance in the universities when the latter came to the United States in the
1930s. Cheryl Misak makes her point strongly and convincingly. But the inconvenient of
such a selective reading is to cast into shadow so many parts of the story that some
questions of method inevitably arise.
2 1. As Cheryl Misak’s book consists finally in a classification, the first question to ask is
about the criteria she uses to class such or such an author in one of the two trends. She
has taken what she considers the central theme of pragmatism, namely its theory of
truth,  thus dividing the pragmatists  between the objectivists  and the subjectivists  in
matter of truth. While it is indisputable that critics of pragmatism have focused on truth,
this  does  not  entail  that  truth is  the best  thread to  understand the development  of
pragmatism.  It  is  certainly not the only one.  Does Cheryl  Misak believe that  to be a
pragmatist should imply to be a pluralist in our classification of pragmatists? It has been
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claimed for instance that the main divide between pragmatists is between those who
insist on the primacy of experience and those who consider that empiricism was the
childhood  disease  of  pragmatism,  to  be  cured  by  taking  the  linguistic  turn.  In  this
classification, Peirce and James would stand together against Sellars and Rorty. Even if we
take the theory of truth to be the right criteria, we could divide them between those who
just want to clarify the correspondence theory, which is nominally good, by a kind of
verificationism (James and Peirce again) and those who, dropping all consideration of
experience, provide us with a version or another of the coherence theory (such as Rorty’s
notion of consensus), the distinction between a more objective and a more subjective pole
being secondary and subordinated to this major one which crosses all  the history of
philosophy. We could also distinguish between those who think that we have to address
the epistemological problems for their own sake and those who think that what matters
in definitive for a pragmatist is the reform of our values. In short, Cheryl Misak has to
justify her choice against other competing and equally legitimate choices, taking them
seriously and comparing the practical consequences of each classification: what do we
lose  in  our  understanding  of  pragmatism when  we  take  the  theory  of  truth  as  the
essential criteria against which to understand and discuss each and every pragmatist of
the last 150 years? In the following sections, I will state what constitutes to my mind some
drawbacks of her choice, both from a normative as well as from a descriptive point of
view.
3 2.  If  we adopt a pragmatist conception of classification,  we have to admit that every
classification  is  teleological.  Cheryl  Mysak’s  purpose  is  in  this  view  clear:  to  put
pragmatism back in the “mainstream” (last word of the book). Her interest is to make
pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy  converge,  which  she  does  in  two  ways:  by
recounting  the  story  of  the  absence  of  a  break  between  pragmatists  and  logical
empiricists and by relying on an ambiguous definition of what is analytic philosophy. She
seems to accept a minimal conception of what analytic philosophy is, characterized only
by a way of doing philosophy, a method consisting in using argumentative rigor to justify
our assertions. However, as she explains all along the book through recurrent analyses of
Peirce’s  indispensability  argument,  the  very  practice  of  asserting  and  arguing
presupposes that we aim to get things right so that aiming to the truth is a regulative
assumption of our very practice of doing philosophy in an analytic way. In short, analytic
philosophy as a mere style of  philosophy presupposes the very pragmatist  (and very
substantial) theory of truth that she intends to promote. But I  am not sure that this
purpose, as legitimate as it can be, will do any good for the future of pragmatism. First,
because it tends to present pragmatism’s history as the divide between a kind of (good)
analytic  pragmatism  (of  which  Peirce  is  the  main  forerunner)  and  a  kind  of  (bad)
continental  pragmatism  (of  which  Rorty  is  the  main  outcome).  The  divide  within
pragmatism would then be but the repercussion of the great divide between analytic and
continental philosophy: pragmatism would only be the American way of dealing with this
great  divide.  The  conclusion  is  that  pragmatism  has  brought  nothing  essential  to
philosophy, so that nothing essential would have been lost if America had not entered the
philosophical scene. We would have had good analytic philosophy in Austria and England
and bad continental philosophy in transcendental Germany and postmodernist France.
Otto Neurath’s boat, floating on the open sea, would not have needed to come to the
shores of America to discover anti-foundationalism with objectivity. Second, this version
of pragmatism will have the practical consequence of discouraging the attempt to render
pragmatism a third way between analytic  and continental  philosophy.  It  was Rorty’s
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project to show that pragmatism can overcome the shortcomings of both analytic and
continental  philosophies  while  taking the best  of  the two traditions,  and even if  we
disagree with the way Rorty implemented this program, this seems a more promising way
of seeing pragmatism than to bring it back to the “mainstream.” Besides, was this not
already the case with the historical pragmatists? Shouldn’t we see Peirce as overcoming
both  Hegel’s  metaphysics  and  Mill’s  logic?  James  as  distancing  himself  from  both
Bergson’s  antinaturalist  spiritualism  and  Russell’s  atomistic  empiricism?  Dewey  as
leaving behind both Heidegger and Carnap? And Rorty as trying to write after both Quine
and Derrida, correcting the one with the other? In another book, Cheryl Misak wrote that
there are indeed “significant  differences between pragmatism and logical  empiricism
(pragmatism was friendly to  ethics,  to  context,  and to the history of  philosophy for
instance)”  (Misak,  2010:  217).  Well,  ethics,  context  and  history  of  philosophy  have
certainly  been  at  the  forefront  of  continental  philosophy  and  we  can  be  glad  that
pragmatism managed to keep them going. Isn’t Misak’s book the perfect illustration that
an  historical  narration  can  be  allied  with  a  logical  argumentation  to  promote
philosophical theses?
4 3. But the worst consequences of Cheryl Misak’s normative position are certainly found
on the descriptive level. As paradoxical as it may seem, she is still too much under the
influence of Rorty. She has so much conceived her book in opposition to Rorty’s version
of pragmatism that he is  everywhere,  as she takes for granted the genealogy he has
himself given to his own pragmatism (James and Dewey rather than Peirce). She is fatally
led not  only  to  simplifications  (“the  James/Rorty  position,”  “the  jamesian branch of
pragmatism,” 2013: 231, 254) but also to errors of interpretation. She is yet at her best
when she tries to right some wrongs committed against the good guys. Her best chapter
shows how Lewis is not guilty of the myth of the given, and she takes pains to read very
closely the texts to debunk what she sees as unfair criticisms. On the very topic of the
theory of truth, she also succeeds in absolving Peirce from conceiving truth as an ideal
limit, which had become the traditional way of presenting his views. But when it comes to
James, Schiller or Dewey, the fair and careful reading seems forgotten. No defense against
the way they have been caricatured; on the contrary, she endorses the main bulk of the
criticisms  from  the  part  of  the  anti-pragmatists:  they  pave  the  way  to  radical
subjectivism. She does not seem eager to show how Schillers’s distinction between the
propositions which claim to be true, but are not, and the claims to truth which are valid,
undermines all charge of relativism – especially as the sorting between valid and invalid
truth-claims are made according to Schiller by the trial of experience and not by any a
priori inspection of the propositions (Schiller makes of this distinction the very definition
of his pragmatism, and on this point he is effectively concordant with what Peirce, James
and Dewey thought).
5 I have to insist a bit on James, as he is taken by Cheryl Misak as the classical pragmatism’s
equivalent of Rorty, Rorty being the “contemporary pragmatism’s William James” (2013:
225).  Like Russell  did,  Misak’s  too links  closely  James’s  pragmatism with the will-to-
believe doctrine, which amounts to saying, according to her, that “I am free to believe
whatever appeals to me” (2013: 160), so that “we can simply choose the beliefs we should
accept” (2013: 147), even beliefs “unbacked by reasons” (2013: 148), without waiting for
any evidence that would support them, provided these beliefs give us satisfaction, which
is evidence enough. From this way of justifying religious faith (religion makes me happy,
so I  choose to believe that  there is  a  God),  James would have smoothly moved to a
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subjectivist  theory  of  truth  that  claims  that  the  truth  of  a  belief  is  relative  to  the
individual who adopts it so that truth is variable from person to person (is true whatever
belief that satisfies a given individual in its subjectivity). Let us not forget that between
the will-to-believe doctrine and the pragmatist theory of truth, James wrote The Varieties
of Religious Experience where he seems to take mystical experiences for evidence that God
exists, even if they are convincing only for the mystic. Well, I would like to repeat what
James said in answer to the very same criticisms: “It is difficult to excuse such a parody of
the pragmatist’s opinion” (James, 1975b: 104). Cheryl Misak quotes rightly the thesis of
the will  to believe: “our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must,  decide an
option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be
decided on intellectual grounds” (James, 1979: 20). According to this thesis, the will to
believe has no necessary relation with the defense of religious faith as it is only a very
general method to solve philosophical dilemmas. This method is not specifically religious
in itself and is conceived to be applied to every kind of topics where such dilemmas occur,
such as the traditional antinomies between freedom and determinism. The will to believe,
like pragmatism in its first intention, is thus a method and only a method that stands for
no particular results. The philosophical problems such a method is supposed to solve are
dilemmas of a very specific kind. The first condition for a dilemma to be liable to be
solved  by  the  will-to-believe  method  is  to  be  “genuine”:  the  theoretical  difference
between the alternative must make a practical difference in the conduct of those who
choose one option rather than the other in the dilemma. The second condition is that the
dilemma cannot by its  very nature be decided “on intellectual  grounds” – that is  by
justifying one option or the other by way of empirical proofs and/or logical reasoning. All
debates such as scientific controversies that are or could be solved by waiting for the
proper observation or deduction are thus not candidates for such a test.  We are not
entitled by the will-to-believe method to believe “ahead of the evidence” (2013: 62) as
there is no evidence to be expected by the very nature of the dilemma. Note also that no
existing theology passes the second test,  as they all  contain propositions that can be
refuted  “on  intellectual  ground.”  The  only  legitimate  problems  are  thus  moral  and
metaphysical dilemmas – moral dilemmas as they are not about facts but about the value
of some facts (“moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is
good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the
worths, both of what exists and of what does not exists, we must consult not science, but
what  Pascal  calls  our  heart,”  James,  1979:  27  –  typically:  “is  life  worth living?”);
metaphysical dilemmas in so far as they are not about some fact in the world but about
the whole of facts (“When the objects are concrete, particular, and familiar, our reactions
are firm and certain enough […] and then the object confronts us, that knocks our mental
door and ask to be let in,  and fixed and decided and actively met,  is just this whole
universe itself and its essence. What are they and how shall I meet them?” (James, 1979:
98)  –  typically:  is  the  whole universe,  my  actions  included,  determined  from  the
beginning?) Contrary to Wittgenstein who thinks that such “problems of life” cannot be
argued, James tried to device a method to discuss and justify the choice of one option
against the other – a specific method for ethics and metaphysics but equivalent to the
experimental method designed to tackle the problems soluble “on intellectual grounds”
only: comparing the practical consequences in our life that would follow from the choice
of one option rather than the other in the dilemma (try it and we will see). Trying to find
a method of inquiry apt to cope with questions of value is a hallmark of all  genuine
pragmatists,  as  Cheryl  Misak rightly  notices.  The clearest  case  of  application of  this
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method in James’ work does not concern the dilemma between theism and atheism, but
rather the one between determinism and indeterminism – which was certainly one of the
most, if not the most, important problem for him from a metaphysical and moral point of
view. James’ personal choice to “keep the faith in freedom” as he said shows us that the
very concept of  faith has nothing to do with religious matters,  but rather denotes a
general  attitude  of  refusing  to  lose  hope  for  the  future  (which  is  all  the  belief  in
indeterminism means – or, for that matter, the belief in God).2 Like many others, Peirce
mistook what James says in this essay. We are so used to think that James is the one who
has not understood Peirce that we take for granted that Peirce has always understood
James…
6 As for pragmatism, when James uses terms such as “individual” or “particular,” it is never
to suggest that truth could vary for you and for me, but rather to indicate that the truth-
relation between a belief and that which it is about has to be describable in a specific and
concrete way. Take the application of the pragmatic method: “the universe is one” means
only that we can point some specific and concrete connections (e.g. the heat-conduction
or  the  postal  system)  between  one  part  and  another  of  the  universe,  so  that  this
proposition is true just so far as we can point and describe those various types of union.
James never says that you can choose to believe what you want in this matter according
to  your  taste  or  temperament.  In  the  same fashion,  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of
“material substance” does not vary from one person to the other: you can like or dislike
cherries, but your individual taste has nothing to do with the way Berkeley or James
makes the idea of a cherry clear, by reducing it to specific and concrete elements (the
sensations  of  color,  figure,  hardness  and  the  like,  as  opposed  to  the  indescribable
substance). That is why James is a verificationist (a liberal one, like Wright, Peirce and
Dewey): describing in each case the specific and concrete process of verification is the
only way to make clear the general and abstract relation of correspondence that makes a
belief true. This has nothing to do with individuals in their variable subjectivity. When I
believe that there are tigers in India, I do not choose to do so because I love those majestic
animals, so that if you happen to believe the contrary, I would try to convince you by
showing you how wonderfully happy you would be if you were to believe like me. James
very clearly says that the proposition “there are tigers in India” is true if you (or me or
anybody) can take a plane (or a boat), go to India, and see some tigers. Or you can phone
the guardian of an Indian national park, if you have good reason to believe him. There is a
satisfaction to be proved right, but this satisfaction is only the satisfaction to have arrived
where one planned to be, and it is “insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to. If
the reality assumed were canceled from the pragmatist’s universe of discourse, he would
straightway  give  the  name  of  falsehoods  to  the  beliefs  remaining,  in  spite  of  their
satisfactoriness” (James, 1975b: 106). It is quite astonishing to see Cheryl Misak stresses so
forcefully the role of experience that constrains the truth and falsity of our beliefs or
propositions in Peirce’s or Lewis’s epistemologies and fail to remind us that experience is
certainly the keyword of James’s and Dewey’s philosophies which they take in conformity
with Locke’s concept, as meaning something (like the taste of the pineapple) that we
cannot suppress when we have it and something that we cannot create from the sole
resources of our mind when we do not have it (try to produce the taste of the pineapple
on your tongue without eating one: that is the “surprise” of experience Peirce talked
about). As James said: “between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past
and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he [the pragmatist]
feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their
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operations?” (James, 1975a: 111-112). Cheryl Misak notes sometimes that there are two
sides in James’s thought – let us name them Dr. Scientific Psychologist, who talks about
objective  verification  in  experience,  and  Mr.  Believe,  who  talks  about  subjective
satisfaction. But these are the two sides of the same coin: classical pragmatism is both an
empiricism and a naturalism as she claims herself. “Verification” is part of the empiricist
vocabulary while “satisfaction” (or “utility”) is part of the naturalist one. According to
James, it amounts to the same thing to say that the intellectual instruments we device put
us in a satisfying relation to our environment when the environment select them and that
the beliefs or theories we frame are verified when they pass the trial of experience. Let us just
say that her chapter on James (or on Dewey) is not indefeasible.
7 4.  I  would like to add a last methodological  remark regarding the classification.  It  is
misleading to say that Cheryl Misak proposes to distinguish between two branches or two
kinds of pragmatism, as all there really is according to her presentation is a unique ladder
with Peirce at  the top and Rorty at  the bottom.  Her work provides  us  with no real
comparative contrast, but rather with what we could call a biased contrast, where the
presence of a positive element is contrasted only with the absence of the element in
question and not with another positive element (“One kind tries to retain a place for
objectivity and for our aspiration to get things right while the other is not nearly so
committed to that,” 2013: 246). Comparative anthropologist taught us that we should not
talk  about  the  contrast  between modern occidental  societies  and the  other  as  being
between rational and irrational societies, as if these other societies could only be defined
by the absence of our rationality (this is a case of ethnocentrism). I believe her book
suffered from “peircocentrism,” in so far as the recurrent reproach addressed to people
like James, Dewey, Schiller or Rorty is that they are not peircian enough (while others are
good in so far as they rediscovered Peirce’s conceptions). It is a very legitimate enterprise
to try to classify the pragmatists, but we should aim at finding a real comparative
contrast. I would suggest that if James, Schiller, Dewey (and Rorty) could be gathered in
the same class, it is because they think that the most important thing human beings can
do is to try to get things better. Meliorism is at the center of their vision, hence the idea
of a plastic universe where real changes can be done, of the human mind as a set of
instruments  made  to  improve  our  capacity  of  changing  our  environment,  of  the
experimental method as being the best way to control the changes, of the democracy as
being the best way to make everyone participate in changes that concerns everyone. To
get things right is of tremendous importance for them as it is the surest way to get things
better. In short, we would have those who think that we have to hope for the truth (the
hope to get things right) and those who think that truth is for the hope (the hope to get
things better). For the latter, transformative kind of pragmatism, knowledge is for the
sake of action (that is for the sake of the improvement of our situation). Action does not
play a huge role in Cheryl Misak’s book on pragmatism. It is as if the only action worth
mentioning were the practice of talking and asserting – so much so that pragmatism’s
naturalism would only consist  in extracting the norms of  truth from those linguistic
practices, which seem a very thin naturalism compared to the thick biological naturalism
present in James’s, Dewey’s or Mead’s view of man as an acting intelligent organism in a
natural and social environment. The primacy of practice means for them to look at every
problem,  the nature of  truth included,  from the point  of  view of  an agent  who has
something to do concerning this problem, not from the point of view of a spectator that can
stand outside what James called “the arena of life.”
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8 Notwithstanding these few remarks, I am in complete agreement with her program to
determine  what  pragmatism  should  be,  namely  a  way  of  being  anti-foundationalist
without being relativist. But I would firstly do more credit to Rorty as the first one who
redescribed pragmatism as an antifoundationalism, a category that he articulated and
which he successfully used to cast a new light on the old pragmatists as well as on the
story of analytical philosophy. And secondly I would not choose this position to divide the
American pragmatists, as it is a common thread that may be shown to link old, new and
neo-pragmatists together – James and Dewey are part of this family, and even Rorty when
he took as his philosophical agenda to reconcile his criticism of the notion of truth with
his hope for progress – that he may not have succeeded does not change the fact that
such was his line. But even if it is so, there may still be room, as Cheryl Misak wisely
notices, for “interfamilial issues” (2013: 251).
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NOTES
1. Cheryl  Misak,  The  American  Pragmatists,  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  2013.  When  not
otherwise noticed, all references in the text will be to this work.
2. Concerning the religious dilemma, I would defend the idea that the will to believe-method
allows us to make the atheist option prevail. Firstly, we should consider that what James calls
“God” has evaporated to the estate of a vague and finite moral force, since every theological
dogma  such  as  creationism  that  contradicts  some  established  scientific  theories  does  not
constitute a real option in the dilemma and can safely be eliminated on intellectual grounds only.
Secondly,  the  application  of  the  method  leads  James  to  acknowledge  that  the  practical
consequences  of  theism  are  the  same  as  those  of  indeterminism,  both  being  “general
cosmological theory of promise,” so that we do not lose anything important by not believing in
God, provided that we do believe in freedom. Finally, James’ belief in an eternal moral order that
God incarnates entails the curiously anti-pragmatic idea of a “higher guarantee” that secures the
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issue of the flux of our experiences. This idea threatens the core belief of indeterminacy, so that
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